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Due Process, Collective Bargaining
and Section 2(d) of the Charter:
A Comment on B.C. Health Services*
Jamie Cameron**

I. THE DEMISE OF PRECEDENT
The year 2007 marked the 25th anniversary of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms,1 as well as the 20th anniversary of the Supreme
Court of Canada’s decisions in the Labour Trilogy.2 The cases
comprising the Trilogy — landmarks which held that section 2(d) does
not protect collective bargaining or the right to strike — gave the
Charter’s guarantee of associational freedom a confined and
demoralizing interpretation. At the time, the Labour Trilogy was a
profound disappointment to those who had hoped that the Charter would
enlarge the rights of workers.3 Instead, the Court reacted to fears about
section 2(d)’s implications for labour relations with a confused and
apprehensive concept of entitlement. Despite failing to establish a
definition of the right, the Labour Trilogy was determinative; until this

*
This article was originally published in the Canadian Labour and Employment Law
Journal (2006-2007) 13 C.L.E.L.J. 233 and is reprinted here by permission of Lancaster House
Publishing (Toronto: <http://www.lancasterhouse.com>).
**
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I would like to thank
Bernie Adell for commenting on and editing this article, and Michael Lynk for his comments on an
earlier draft.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
See Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Alberta Reference”]; Public Service Alliance of Canada
v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.); and R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan,
[1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.) (comprising the “Labour Trilogy”).
3
See, e.g., P. Poirier, “Court dashes labor’s hopes of more rights” The Globe and Mail,
April 10, 1987, at A1; A. Hutchinson, “Unions have to go political after letdown of the Charter” The
Globe and Mail, April 16, 1987, at A7; J. Fryer & L. Brown, “Little hope for the workers in rulings
on Charter” The Globe and Mail, May 20, 1987, at A7.
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year, the guarantee had virtually no impact on labour relations, nor did it
protect the entitlement in other settings.4
By enshrining freedom of association as one of its fundamental
freedoms, Canada followed the lead of international and European
human rights instruments. In this, the Charter’s framework filled a gap in
the much-hallowed Bill of Rights: Canada had the foresight to guarantee
a right Americans do not explicitly enjoy.5 By making it the equal of the
Charter’s other guarantees, the text of section 2(d) created an
opportunity for the Supreme Court of Canada to develop a distinctive
concept of associational freedom. Rather than seize the opportunity, the
Court flinched. To be fair, timing may have been a factor: section 2(d)
arrived at the Court for the first time in the wake of milestone decisions
in Hunter v. Southam Inc.,6 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,7 Reference re
Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.) S. 94(2),8 and R. v. Oakes.9 The rightsprotective approach of those cases was out of the question for section
2(d), where a large and liberal interpretation of the guarantee could
constitutionalize all human activity except the isolated acts of
individuals. Especially in light of the formidable standard of justification
newly in place under R. v. Oakes, such an approach was not an option.
4
The Court found no breach of s. 2(d) in the Labour Trilogy or in the following cases: R.
v. Skinner, [1990] S.C.J. No. 51, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1235 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Skinner”]; P.I.P.S.C. v.
Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] S.C.J. No. 75, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “PIPSC”]; Lavigne v. O.P.S.E.U., [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Lavigne”]; Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 78,
[1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Egg Marketing Agency”]; Delisle v. Canada
(Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Delisle”]; R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] S.C.J. No 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Advance Cutting & Coring”]; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suresh”]; and Harper v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.). See also Black v.
Law Society of Alberta, [1989] S.C.J. No. 27, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Black”]
(deciding the case under s. 6 rather than s. 2(d)). The two exceptions to this pattern are Libman v.
Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Libman”] (non-labour claim); and Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87,
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunmore”] (labour claim).
5
Section 2 of the Charter provides: “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms …
(d) freedom of association.” Compare this to the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
states, in its entirety: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
6
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.).
7
[1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.).
8
[1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor Vehicle
Reference”].
9
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
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The Court moved quickly to tether section 2(d)’s guarantee of
associational freedom, in decisions that placed the spotlight on labour
policy.
Against its stated commitment to a generous and purposive approach
to other Charter guarantees, the Court gave section 2(d) a minimalist
interpretation. In that regard McIntyre J.’s concurring opinion in the
Alberta Reference — the Labour Trilogy’s leading decision — was
indicative. There, he held that constitutionalizing collective efforts
would privilege groups and organizations over individuals.10 That
prospect offended an instinct that activities should not have special
status just because they are initiated by groups.11 This kind of egalitarian
logic led McIntyre J. to conclude that “[p]eople, by merely combining
together, cannot create an entity which has greater constitutional rights
and freedoms than they, as individuals, possess”.12 He found that section
2(d) protects the right of individuals to form an association, and the right
of associations to engage in activities, qua associations, but only where
the activities could lawfully be undertaken by individuals.13 Under that
definition, section 2(d) did not include actions in the name of the
association or in aid of the association’s objects.14
Members of the Court also fretted openly in the Alberta Reference
that section 2(d) had the potential to destroy labour policy. On behalf of
three of the panel’s six members, Le Dain J. voiced strong resistance to
the constitutionalization of such policy.15 In his view, “[t]he rights for
which constitutional protection are sought … are not fundamental rights

10
Supra, note 2. This decision was weakened by fragmentation within the panel, which
comprised only six of the Court’s members. A majority of four dismissed claims that the Charter
protects collective bargaining and the right to strike, but failed to agree on a definition of
associational freedom. Justice Le Dain wrote for a plurality of three judges and McIntyre J. wrote a
separate concurring opinion; Dickson C.J.C. and Wilson J. both dissented, and each wrote separate
reasons.
11
Id., at 398. In that case, the rights of the association would exceed those of the individual
“merely because of the fact of association” (emphasis added). For that reason, McIntyre J. was
firmly of the view that “[f]reedom of association cannot therefore vest independent rights in the
group”: id., at 397 (emphasis added).
12
Id.
13
Under his definition, freedom of association included the right to form an association,
id., at 407, and “will attach to the exercise in association of such rights as have Charter protection
when exercised by the individual”, as well as to “the freedom to associate for the purposes of
activities which are lawful when performed alone”: id., at 409 (emphasis added).
14
In PIPSC, supra, note 4, Sopinka J. reworked McIntyre J.’s conception of associational
freedom and placed it in a four-point framework: infra, note 57.
15
Alberta Reference, supra, note 2, at 391.
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or freedoms … [but] are the creation of legislation”.16 Meanwhile,
McIntyre J.’s objection to an associational conception of entitlement was
also rooted in his opposition to judicial intervention in the “dynamic
process” of labour relations. He bluntly refused to grant unions “an
economic weapon” which would potentially be immune from legislative
control.17 These judges feared that a collective conception of association
might have a domino effect and topple all manner of labour laws. An
individualistic definition of entitlement which excluded union activities
from the Charter eliminated that risk.18
The Labour Trilogy determined the prospects of a guarantee which
would have little or no vitality in its first 20 years. Without further
analysis or reflection, freedom of association was reduced to an all-ornothing proposition: once having refused to protect freedom of
association in the context of collective bargaining, the Court decided not
to protect the entitlement in others.19 As the victories accumulated under
other Charter provisions, section 2(d) became all but invisible. The
Court’s definition of associational freedom was so underinclusive over
the years that claims succeeded on two occasions only, in Libman v.
Quebec (Attorney General)20 and Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General).21
In the circumstances, few predicted that the Supreme Court of
Canada would mark the Labour Trilogy’s 20th anniversary by overruling
its own precedents and announcing in B.C. Health Services that section
2(d) does protect collective bargaining after all.22 Purely in institutional
terms, the decision is monumental: the Supreme Court took the extreme

16
Id. In his view, activities which were recognized as a matter of statutory permission or
privilege could not be so easily, automatically or immutably transformed by the Charter.
17
Id., at 415.
18
Id., at 398 (per McIntyre J., who stated that “[c]ollective bargaining is a group concern
… but the group can exercise only the constitutional rights of its individual members”, and that “[i]f
the right asserted is not found in the Charter for the individual, it cannot be implied for the group
merely by the fact of association”).
19
The dilemma was that “[i]f s. 2(d) protects only the right to come together and form an
association, its importance is relatively modest. On the other hand, if it were held also to protect the
essential activities of the group, it would have enormous impact, particularly in the realm of labour
relations.” R. Sharpe, K. Swinton & K. Roach, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 2d ed.
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002), at 151. Examples include Skinner, Black, Suresh and Harper, supra,
note 4.
20
Supra, note 4.
21
Supra, note 4.
22
Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Health Services”].
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step of overruling itself.23 Despite effectively doing so on other
occasions — as, for instance, in R. v. Mills24 and United States of
America v. Burns25 — the Court has been hesitant to overrule its own
precedents. Another factor is the McLachlin Court’s decision-making
tempo, which adds to the intrigue of B.C. Health Services. Many see this
as a deeply conservative Court, one that is unusually shrewd and
parsimonious in its use of institutional authority. Yet this same Court has
an appetite, albeit one that is infrequently indulged, for risky and
innovative Charter interpretations.26 Predictions about when the judges
will be moved to act, on which issues, and in what circumstances, are a
matter of sheer guesswork.
B.C. Health Services is a case in point.27 Though section 2(d)’s
prospects brightened after Dunmore v. Ontario, the Court’s decision to
overrule precedent, constitutionalize collective bargaining, and impose a
Charter duty to bargain in good faith was radical, to say the least. In
doing so, the joint majority opinion, written by McLachlin C.J.C. and
LeBel J., skimmed lightly over a body of case law that had consistently
been tentative and uneasy about section 2(d). The Labour Trilogy baldly
exposed the Court’s discomfort with a concept of entitlement that might
indiscriminately constitutionalize activity of all descriptions, simply
because it was collective in nature. As well, the Court has been constant
23
The Court overruled the Labour Trilogy, supra, note 2, as well as PIPSC, supra, note 4.
For another example of the Court’s overruling itself, albeit one that is less dramatic, see Nova Scotia
(Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, at para. 47
(S.C.C.) (describing the ratio in Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] S.C.J No.
115, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854 (S.C.C.), as “no longer good law”).
24
[1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.) (essentially overruling the majority
opinion in R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.), on the strength of
“dialogue” between Parliament and the courts).
25
[2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.) (essentially overruling Kindler v.
Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 (S.C.C.) and Reference re
Ng Extradition (Can.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 64, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858 (S.C.C.), on the strength of
changed perceptions of the death penalty). On the subject of same-sex rights, compare M. v. H.,
[1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) and Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995]
2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.).
26
See Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791
(S.C.C.) (invalidating a legislative provision which prohibited access to private health care
insurance and constitutionalizing the health care system, to some extent, in doing so), and
Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1
S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.) (invalidating Parliament’s scheme for the security certificate process).
27
Supra, note 22. The Court sat as a panel of seven in B.C. Health Services. Justice
Charron was not included in the panel, and Rothstein J.’s process of appointment had not been
completed at the time of the hearing. Six judges signed the joint opinion of McLachlin C.J.C. and
LeBel J., and Deschamps J. wrote separately, in partial dissent.
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in its aversion to the constitutionalization of labour relations; while
Dunmore unsettled that pattern, Bastarache J.’s reasons in that case
carefully avoided dislodging precedent. From the time of the Labour
Trilogy, those dynamics had conspired to hold section 2(d) at bay.
Against this backdrop, B.C. Health Services reads as a supremely
confident decision. In a bold opinion, McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J.
easily discounted the concerns that had held section 2(d) jurisprudentially
in check for so long. Rather than concede the legitimacy of those
concerns, the Court forged on, waving off the jurisprudence of the first
20 years on the strength of Dunmore. At the forefront of many questions
which arise from B.C. Health Services is the decision’s impact on
collective bargaining, specifically, and on labour relations, more
generally. A key point for debate concerns the framework that this
decision has established for public sector bargaining under the Charter.
That issue invites close attention but should not obscure another, equally
important, question, which is whether and in what ways the case may
affect the Court’s conception of associational freedom. The decision to
overrule precedent created a conceptual hiatus in the section 2(d)
jurisprudence; what freedom of association means will no longer be
found in the Labour Trilogy and P.I.P.S.C. v. Northwest Territories
(Commissioner) but will take its lead, instead, from B.C. Health
Services. Surely it is odd, in such circumstances, that the Court’s
decision never ventured beyond the collective bargaining context, and
expressed no interest in developing a theory of entitlement.
This article focuses less on the decision’s importance to labour law
and more on its broader consequences for section 2(d). Specifically, it
examines the Court’s discussion of associational freedom in the context
of collective bargaining to see whether the decision offers a theory of
entitlement for the guarantee. The inquiry follows a trajectory that
analyzes the key elements of the Court’s methodology: first is the
creation of due process rights for collective bargaining; second is a
conception of section 2(d) as a source of positive rights; and third is the
role of context in constitutional analysis. What emerges from the
discussion are doubts about the soundness of the doctrines the Court
relied on to constitutionalize collective bargaining. Those doubts lead to
the conclusion that B.C. Health Services could have regressive
consequences for section 2(d) and its promise of associational freedom.
The article closes with a section which develops that concern by
pointing out a tension, or ambivalence, that has infused the section 2(d)
case law from the beginning. The tension is between an interpretation of
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section 2(d) which is content-dependent and focused on the question of
labour entitlements, and one which is abstract and more inclusive in its
view of associational freedom. B.C. Health Services expressed
disapproval of the Court’s early jurisprudence and its abstract or
“generic” definition of the guarantee, because it excluded union
activities from the Charter, and repeatedly noted the superiority of a
contextual approach. In at least one respect the point is well taken: the
Labour Trilogy did err in adopting an individualistic conception of a
collective right. Even so, that point does not render section 2(d)’s
underlying values and principles irrelevant, and deciding cases by a
process of serial contextualization is not the answer.
Though both approaches — the abstract and the contextual — have a
presence in the jurisprudence, the Supreme Court’s section 2(d)
decision-making in recent years has favoured labour claims.28 B.C.
Health Services represents the culmination, thus far, of a trend that
interprets the guarantee primarily, though not exclusively, from that
perspective. The danger in this is that associational freedom may cease
to have content and relevance outside the labour law setting.
It was honest and forthright for the Supreme Court to overrule
precedents that it now regards as unprincipled. At the least, B.C. Health
Services and its model for the partial constitutionalization of collective
bargaining will have enormous consequences for labour relations in this
country. Meanwhile, the decision to overrule section 2(d)’s founding
precedents marooned the guarantee; for whatever reason, the Court
chose not to comment more generally on associational freedom or to
indicate how it should be interpreted. Accordingly, this article proposes
that B.C. Health Services be read as the Court seemingly intended — on
its own terms, as a decision that is specific to the status of collective
bargaining under the Charter. In other words, B.C. Health Services has
opened the door to labour claims under section 2(d), without shutting it
on a reconsideration of section 2(d)’s theoretical underpinnings. Far
28
See Dunmore and Advance Cutting & Coring, supra, note 4. See also Lavigne, supra,
note 4 (earlier decision vindicating a union claim under s. 2(d)); R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. PepsiCola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (S.C.C.) (protecting
secondary picketing at common law, under s. 2(b) Charter values); and U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v.
KMart Canada Ltd., [1999] S.C.J. No. 44, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083 (S.C.C.) (protecting leafletting
activities under s. 2(b) of the Charter). See “Special Section on Labour Law and the Charter” in
(2003) 10 C.L.E.L.J. 1 and ff. (suggesting, at 2, that “the Supreme Court of Canada has breathed
new life into the Charter in its application to labour law”). Meanwhile, non-labour claims have
consistently been rejected; see Suresh, Harper and (at an earlier point in time) Canadian Egg
Marketing Agency, supra, note 4.
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from foreclosing that possibility, the Court’s decision both contemplates
and invites a re-conceptualization of the guarantee.

II. SECTION 2(d), DUE PROCESS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
1. The Constitutionalization of Collective Bargaining
B.C. Health Services overruled the Labour Trilogy and PIPSC,
which were the Court’s key decisions on section 2(d) prior to Dunmore.29
In doing so, the Court explained, in firm but diplomatic terms, that “the
reasons evoked in the past for holding that the guarantee of freedom of
association does not extend to collective bargaining can no longer
stand”.30 The Chief Justice and LeBel J. wrote that Dunmore “opened the
door to reconsideration of that view”,31 and this observation made it
relatively painless for them to dispatch previous case law which had
tenaciously excluded collective bargaining from the Charter. Thus
emboldened by a single decision — Dunmore — the judges declared that
“the holdings in the Alberta Reference and PIPSC excluding collective
bargaining from the scope of s. 2(d) can no longer stand”.32
Throughout, the joint majority opinion focused singular attention on
collective bargaining and its status under the Charter, overruling the
Court’s precedents as a prelude to constructing a due process model of
collective bargaining under section 2(d). That enterprise led to a
conclusion that provincial legislation unilaterally altering the terms of
employment for certain health care workers was invalid because it
undercut “the right of employees to associate in a process of collective
action to achieve workplace goals”.33 In defining this right, the joint
opinion quickly isolated the process for pursuing workplace goals from
the outcomes of that process and the question of whether those goals
29

Supra, note 4.
B.C. Health Services, supra, note 22, at para. 20.
31
Id., at para. 22.
32
Id., at para. 36.
33
Id., at para. 19. In the result, the Court upheld ss. 4 and 5, but invalidated ss. 6(2), 6(4)
and 9 of the Health and Social Services Delivery Improvement Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 2. Sections 4 and
5, which dealt with relatively minor modifications to schemes for transferring and reassigning
employees, took these issues off the “collective bargaining table”, but were upheld by the Court. By
contrast, the sections which dealt with contracting out (i.e., s. 6(2) and (4)), layoffs (i.e., s. 9(a), (b),
and (c)), and bumping (i.e., s. 9(d)) infringed s. 2(d) because they addressed matters that were
central to freedom of association and could not be upheld under s. 1 of the Charter. The Court
declared those provisions unconstitutional but suspended its declaration of unconstitutionality for 12
months.
30
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were, in fact, achieved. The result was a model of due process which
partly constitutionalized collective bargaining, but specifically excluded
its substantive content from section 2(d).34 The first step in the Court’s
methodology proposed a definition of the right which was procedural,
rather than substantive, in nature. In that regard, it is striking that s. 2(d)
had never before been limited to, or organized around, rights of due
process. In addition to the decision’s implications for labour relations,
the broader concern is that B.C. Health Services may have read the
guarantee down from a substantive, to a procedural, entitlement.
The Court’s model of due process rights recognized that access to a
collective bargaining process would not be effective unless “corresponding duties” were imposed on government employers. The second part
of the joint opinion’s methodology introduced a combination of
affirmative entitlement and positive obligation: B.C. Health Services
held that employee associations have the right to engage in collective
bargaining (except in certain circumstances) and that employers who are
bound by the Charter have a positive obligation or duty to bargain with
them in good faith. Here, as in Dunmore, the Court promoted a
conception of section 2(d) as a source of affirmative entitlements for
workers. The result was a standard of due process in collective
bargaining which requires that the state “not substantially interfere with
the ability of a union to exert meaningful influence over working
conditions through a process of collective bargaining conducted in
accordance with the duty to bargain in good faith”.35 Unlike Dunmore,
which rested on the historical circumstances of agricultural workers,
B.C. Health Services established a constitutional norm for collective
bargaining across a broad spectrum. Despite the enormity of that step
and its consequences for labour relations, the decision’s implications for
section 2(d) as a whole and for the concept of associational freedom
under the Charter are uncertain. In that regard, the difficulty is that the
Court recognized positive duties without explaining what role such
obligations should play in section 2(d)’s interpretation.
The third element of the methodology is “context”. As already
noted, the degree to which it dominated the analysis in B.C. Health
Services is telling. The Chief Justice and LeBel J. showcased the Court’s
34
The point was repeated several times: id., at para. 89 (stating that s. 2(d) “does not
guarantee the particular objectives sought through this associational activity”), and para. 91
(confirming that “as the right is to a process, it does not guarantee a certain substantive or economic
outcome”).
35
Id., at para. 90.
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attention to context at every opportunity, and compared their approach in
B.C. Health Services to the “de-contextualization” for which they faulted
the earlier jurisprudence.36 Despite providing a fresh perspective on
collective bargaining, this approach treated context as the key to an
analysis under section 2(d). In doing so, the joint majority opinion
showed no awareness that an unabated contextual approach can be
narrowing, subjective and easily manipulated. For those reasons, the
Court’s reliance on context invites caution.
Each of these methodological elements of B.C. Health Services
supported the constitutionalization of collective bargaining, yet each
may have regressive consequences for associational freedom under the
Charter. The next sections of this paper identify those consequences but
propose that they can be avoided by reading B.C. Health Services as a
decision that addressed collective bargaining and otherwise left the
interpretation of section 2(d) to another day.
2. Due Process Rights under Section 2(d)
The Court was poised for change in B.C. Health Services, and
motivated to act by two key factors. First, the status quo, which
entrenched “a judicial ‘no go’ zone for an entire right”, was no longer
acceptable to the Court.37 The Chief Justice and LeBel J. concluded that
the precedents which established this “no go” zone could not be
sustained. As they explained, the principle of judicial restraint in the
section 2(d) jurisprudence pushed deference “too far”.38 Second,
Dunmore v. Ontario enabled the Court to override precedent’s “narrow
focus on individual activities” and to confirm that activities of an
“inherently collective” nature are protected by section 2(d).39 A few
years earlier, Dunmore stood at the brink. Rather than overrule the
Labour Trilogy, the Court at that time simply deflected its decision away
from the weight of precedent. In B.C. Health Services the Court took the

36

Id., at para. 30.
Id., at para. 26.
38
Id. (stating that “to declare a judicial ‘no go’ zone for an entire right on the ground that it
may involve the courts in policy matters is to push deference too far”).
39
Id., at para. 28 (stating that Dunmore “rejected the notion that freedom of association
applies only to activities capable of performance by individuals”, and adding — after referring to
Dickson C.J.C.’s Alberta Reference dissent — that “some collective activities may, by their very
nature, be incapable of being performed by an individual”).
37
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definitive step of confronting the Trilogy jurisprudence, and did so in
Dunmore’s name.
After rejecting restraint and highlighting Dunmore, the Court
searched for a way to achieve the partial constitutionalization of
collective bargaining, and came up with a model of due process under
section 2(d). The joint opinion carefully stressed that collective
bargaining as a procedure “has always been distinguishable from its final
outcomes”, and that it was possible to protect the procedure itself
“without mandating constitutional protection for the fruits of that
bargaining process”.40 The judges went on to define the entitlement as a
right of access to a bargaining process that is free from “substantial
interference” by government employers, who are under a Charter duty to
meet and bargain in good faith.
To determine whether section 2(d) has been violated, the Chief
Justice and LeBel J. proposed a standard which asks “whether the
process of voluntary, good faith collective bargaining between
employees and the employer has been, or is likely to be, significantly
and adversely impacted”.41 Despite this emphasis on access to a process,
the “substantial interference” test poses substantive questions. For
instance, the first step of the test considers the relative importance of the
collective bargaining issue at stake.42 Then, the second step examines the
state’s conduct, to determine whether the duty to bargain in good faith
has been met.43 In developing this test, the joint opinion emphasized that
its criteria are flexible, not rigid, in character. As the judges explained,
“less central [workplace] matters may be changed more summarily,
without violating s. 2(d)” and, likewise, “[i]mportant [workplace]
changes effected through a process of good faith negotiation may not
violate s. 2(d)”.44 Whether flexible or not, the test drifts beyond the
purely procedural to incorporate questions of substance. The list of
exceptions to what section 2(d) requires in public sector collective
bargaining confirms that the Court’s due process model rests on

40

Id., at para. 29.
Id., at para. 92.
42
It is evident that the test contemplates a subjective assessment of substantive workplace
issues; as it stated, “[t]he more important the matter, the more likely that there is substantial
interference with the s. 2(d) right. Conversely, the less important the matter … the less likely that
there is substantial interference with the s. 2(d) right to collective bargaining”: id., at para. 95.
43
Id., at para. 104.
44
Id., at para. 109.
41
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substantive foundations; this list includes “essential services, vital state
administration, clear deadlocks and national crisis”.45
The degree to which this model will cut a swath through collective
bargaining practices in the public sector is unknown at present. Much
will depend on the “substantial interference” test, which makes a right to
bargain contingent on the substantive importance of the issues at stake,
as well as on what it means to bargain in good faith in any given
circumstance. It is also unclear what concrete exceptions the Court had
in mind under section 2(d) and section 1.46 Even on a conservative
interpretation, it seems clear that the McLachlin-LeBel model will have
a major impact on collective bargaining in the public sector. Given that
prospect, the Court’s procedural conception of associational freedom
might not seem especially important. But a shift away from the
assumption that section 2(d), like the other fundamental freedoms,
guarantees substantive rights should not be overlooked; this could have
transformative implications for the guarantee.
In order to confer “at least a measure of protection” on collective
bargaining, the Court invoked the well-known distinction between
substance and procedure.47 It is a familiar distinction in the Charter
jurisprudence, having been invoked initially — and controversially — in
the Motor Vehicle Reference.48 There, after dismissing the distinction
between substance and procedure, the Court proposed an interpretation
of section 7 which went against the intentions of the Charter’s drafters,49
by authorizing the Court to invalidate legislation that it found
substantively unfair or unjust.50 Far from receding, the debate about the
45
Id., at para. 108 (specifically indicating that interference with collective bargaining,
albeit on an exceptional and typically temporary basis, may be permitted in those situations). See
R. Charney, “The Contract Clause Comes to Canada: The British Columbia Health Services Case
and the Sanctity of Collective Agreements” (2008) 23 N.J.C.L. 65 [hereinafter “Charney”]
(claiming, at 3, that the decision has the potential to result in “a significant interference with
government economic regulation, and to impose laissez-faire economic principles on the Canadian
constitutional fabric”).
46
B.C. Health Services, id., at para. 107 (discussing situations of exigency and urgency,
which may affect the scope of the duty under s. 2(d)), and para. 108 (explaining the kinds of
limitations that may be justified under s. 1).
47
Id., at para. 39.
48
Supra, note 8.
49
Id., at 498 (rejecting the “substance/procedural dichotomy” on the basis that it would
narrow the issue to an “all-or-nothing proposition” and create difficulties by trying to distinguish
between concepts with overlapping boundaries), and 508-509 (overriding the intention of the
Charter’s drafters that the scope of s. 7 be limited to matters of procedure).
50
Key examples, in addition to the Motor Vehicle Reference, id., include R. v.
Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.); R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J.
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legitimacy of review — in general and as exemplified by the Court’s
interpretation of section 7 — continues to this day.51
The distinction between substance and procedure served a different
function in B.C. Health Services. There, it enabled the Court to create a
halfway house between the Labour Trilogy’s “no go” zone for collective
bargaining and the substantive constitutionalization of labour relations.
From the perspective of rights claimants, procedural entitlements may be
less desirable than their substantive counterparts; in B.C. Health
Services, though, such entitlements marked an improvement on the
status quo, which had all but shut labour claims out of section 2(d). It
was inevitable, in the Motor Vehicle Reference, that the Court’s rejection
of the substance-procedure distinction would widen the scope of section
7. In B.C. Health Services, similarly, the Court’s reliance on that
distinction will at least enlarge the scope of section 2(d) as it applies to
collective bargaining rights. Whether it will expand or contract the
guarantee in other settings is less clear.
Prior to B.C. Health Services, there was nothing in the text or history
of section 2(d) to indicate that its content either included or should be
limited to matters that are procedural in nature. Not only does the due
process model run against the accepted interpretation of the guarantee, it
raises the troubling concern that the Court may have read freedom of
association “down” from a substantive entitlement to one that is
procedural in content. Without doubt, that is exactly what B.C. Health
Services did: the Court expanded section 2(d) to include due process
rights for collective bargaining but emphatically confirmed, at the same
time, that substantive entitlements are absolutely and definitively
excluded from the guarantee.52
The Court’s procedural conception of entitlement rested on two
assumptions. The first was that collective bargaining is a procedure,53
and the second was that collective bargaining had been a “fundamental
No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.); R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633
(S.C.C.); and Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), supra, note 26.
51
The Court’s interpretation of s. 7 has generated a significant literature. For criticisms of
this jurisprudence, see J. Cameron, “The Motor Vehicle Reference and the Relevance of American
Doctrine in Charter Adjudication” in R. Sharpe, ed., Charter Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths,
1987); C. Flood, K. Roach & L. Sossin, eds., Access to Care: The Legal Debate over Private Health
Insurance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005); and J. Cameron, “From the MVR to
Chaoulli: The Road Not Taken and the Future of Section 7” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 105.
52
Supra, notes 34 and 40 and accompanying text.
53
B.C. Health Services, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at para. 29 (S.C.C.)
(citing the late Bora Laskin).
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Canadian right”54 and a “fundamental aspect of Canadian society” long
before the Charter arrived.55 Putting the two together — a procedural
conception of collective bargaining and a sympathetic rendering of its
history — led to the conclusion that “[t]he protection enshrined in s. 2(d)
of the Charter may properly be seen as the culmination of a historical
movement towards the recognition of a procedural right to collective
bargaining”.56
This approach offered strategic advantages. It allowed the Court to
distance itself from the substantive aspects of collective bargaining and
sidestep the pesky distinction — deeply entrenched in the section 2(d)
doctrine — between an association and its activities. That distinction
found a central place in the pre-Dunmore case law, which held that the
right to form an association is protected but that the right to engage in
activities in pursuit of an association’s objects is not — not, at least,
unless the same activities would be lawful in the case of individuals.57
This distinction served the important purpose of inhibiting the
constitutionalization of associational activity across the spectrum. 58
Collective bargaining was no exception. Negotiating the terms and
conditions of employment is an activity which is aimed at advancing and
promoting a union’s substantive objects. As such, it was squarely caught
by the case law’s bright-line distinction between an individual’s right to
form or join an association and the activities of the association as a
collective enterprise. The challenge in B.C. Health Services was to
protect the associational activities of labour unions without conferring
constitutional status on collective activities more generally. As well, any
concession that the activities of an association are constitutionally
protected would have required the Court to include Canadian Egg
Marketing Agency v. Richardson59 and Delisle v. Canada60 in its purge of
54

Id., at para. 40.
Id., at para. 41.
56
Id., at para. 68.
57
Though the Labour Trilogy introduced the distinction, its consequences were formalized
in PIPSC’s four-point framework. The four propositions are: first, that s. 2(d) protects the freedom
to establish, belong to and maintain an association; second, that s. 2(d) does not protect an activity
solely on the ground that the activity is a foundational or essential purpose of an association; third,
that s. 2(d) protects the exercise in association of the constitutional rights and freedoms of
individuals; and fourth, that s. 2(d) protects the exercise in association of the lawful rights of
individuals. PIPSC, [1990] S.C.J. No. 75, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367, at 402 (S.C.C.).
58
See Canadian Egg Marketing Agency, [1998] S.C.J. No. 78, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157
(S.C.C.) and Delisle, [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 (S.C.C.) (applying the PIPSC
framework to defeat the s. 2(d) claim in each instance).
59
Id.
60
Supra, note 58.
55
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precedent. Both of those decisions relied on the distinction between an
association and its activities to defeat claims under section 2(d).61
Despite that distinction’s foundational role in the section 2(d)
jurisprudence, B.C. Health Services came close to abandoning the
definitional boundary the Court had drawn between an association and
its activities. Chief Justice McLachlin and LeBel J. observed that “it will
always be possible to characterize the pursuit of a particular activity in
concert with others as the ‘object’ of [an] association”, and therefore
outside section 2(d)’s purview under the Labour Trilogy jurisprudence.62
To avoid this problem, the judges responded with a distinction of their
own, one that separated the associational element — re-characterized as
procedural — from the activity itself, which seeks certain substantive
results.63 Reformulating collective bargaining as a procedure rather than
a substantive activity did little to solve the problem, however, because
other forms of associational activity seem equally “procedural”. In other
words, it is difficult to see why collective bargaining is procedural but
other associational activities, once divorced from their substantive
objects, are not.
The Court did not explain the difference between the process of
collective bargaining and the processes engaged in by other associations,
but neither did it overrule Canadian Egg Marketing Agency or Delisle.
That could not be done without de-legitimizing virtually all of its pre61
In Canadian Egg Marketing Agency, Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ. held that producers
from the Northwest Territories, who complained about their exclusion from an egg marketing
scheme, had confused an activity foundational to the association with an association foundational to
an activity. The joint opinion stated that activity which is foundational to an association is excluded
from s. 2(d), but that an association which is foundational to an activity is not. In other words,
s. 2(d) includes an individual’s initial right to associate and then stops; the rights of associations do
not exist and s. 2(d) does not protect any of an association’s activities, no matter how foundational.
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency cited the PIPSC framework and confirmed that s. 2(d) does not
extend to activities just because individuals form an association to carry on those activities.
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency, supra, note 58, at 227-28 and 232. Justice Bastarache’s
subsequent majority opinion in Delisle affirmed the endorsement of PIPSC in Canadian Egg
Marketing Agency, and applied conventional analysis to defeat the s. 2(d) claim yet again. In
Delisle, he found that freedom of association implies only that activities which employees can carry
on as individuals cannot be prohibited when individuals organize themselves into associations; in
the result, the RCMP “can very well set all working conditions for its members without violating
s. 2(d)”. Delisle, supra, note 58, at paras. 11 and 36 (emphasis added).
62
B.C. Health Services, supra, note 53, at para. 29 (stating, as well, that “[r]ecasting
collective bargaining as an ‘object’ begs the question of whether or not the activity is worthy of
constitutional protection”).
63
Id., at para. 32 (citing Dunmore and Canadian Egg Marketing Agency for the proposition
that “only the ‘associational aspect’ of an activity and not the activity itself [is] protected under
s. 2(d)”).
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Dunmore jurisprudence and embarrassing Bastarache J., who wrote the
majority opinion in both of those cases. Given that quandary, the
substance-procedure distinction allowed the Court to obfuscate its
decision to constitutionalize the activities of unions by highlighting the
“procedural” history of collective bargaining in Canada. At least for the
time being, this avoided an interpretation of section 2(d) that would
constitutionalize the activities of all associations in all circumstances.
Perhaps B.C. Health Services will be read as a decision that confers
due process rights on collective bargaining because of the particular role
which that activity has played in labour relations over time. In other
words, it may not follow from the creation of process rights in these
circumstances that section 2(d)’s substantive entitlement will be read
down in other settings. But it is also possible to read B.C. Health
Services as a decision that potentially re-classifies all associational
activities, and not just collective bargaining, as procedural in nature; on
that view, the decision could dramatically widen the scope of
entitlement. However, such a prospect is unlikely, so it remains a
concern that the Court may now use B.C. Health Services to downgrade
section 2(d) from a substantive to a procedural entitlement in other
cases.
The Court’s interpretation of section 2(d) was grounded in its
perception of what was required to protect collective bargaining under
the Charter. Further evidence that the Court tailored section 2(d) to the
requirements of collective bargaining can be found in its creation of an
affirmative right to bargain and in its imposition on government
employers of a duty to negotiate in good faith.
3. Affirmative Entitlements and Positive Obligations
Had the Labour Trilogy, PIPSC, and Delisle applied, the legislation
at stake in B.C. Health Services would have been upheld. In each of
those cases, the Court found that the right remained intact, though unions
were excluded from a “statutory platform” for collective bargaining,
because the freedom to associate existed “independently of any statutory
regime”.64 Likewise, despite complaining that the statute violated section
2(d) by denying them access to the bargaining process, British
Columbia’s health care workers also remained free to associate. In the
meantime, and without committing the Court to a position on collective
64

Delisle, supra, note 58, at paras. 31, 33.
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bargaining, Dunmore had articulated an affirmative entitlement to
meaningful association and had imposed a positive obligation on the
government to advance its exercise.65 Though limited to the
circumstances of agricultural workers who were historically unable to
form effective associations, Dunmore provided the template for an
alternative interpretation of section 2(d). The result was the decision in
B.C. Health Services, which granted health care workers a positive right
to bargain and imposed a duty on the government employer to bargain in
good faith.
In order to avoid open conflict with Delisle, the decision in Dunmore
set a high threshold for the positive obligation it imposed. The workers
in Dunmore won because the hardship they had suffered in trying to
exercise their associational freedom distinguished their circumstances
from those of the RCMP.66 In discussing Dunmore, the joint opinion in
B.C. Health Services noted that to establish a breach of section 2(d)
“[t]here must be evidence that the freedom would be next to impossible
to exercise without positively recognizing a right of access to a statutory
regime”.67 Only a few pages later, the Court set aside the “next to
impossible” threshold and relied, instead, on the language of “substantial
interference”.68 In B.C. Health Services the resulting standard has two
parts: on the entitlement side, the relative importance of the bargaining
issue determines whether there is an affirmative right to bargain; and on
the obligation side, the question is whether the employer has met its duty
to bargain in good faith.69 As the Chief Justice and LeBel J. explained,
the interference must “seriously undercut or undermine” the collective
65

[2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, at para. 67 (S.C.C.) (stating that the province
was constitutionally obligated to create “at a minimum a regime that provides agricultural workers
with the protection necessary for them to exercise their constitutional freedom to form and maintain
associations”).
66
Id., at para. 41 (comparing their relative circumstances and stating that “[i]t is no wonder
… that agricultural workers have failed to associate in any meaningful way in Ontario, while RCMP
officers have successfully created independent employee associations in several provinces across
Canada”).
67
B.C. Health Services, supra, note 53, at para. 34 (emphasis added).
68
In Dunmore, Bastarache J. had stated that those who claim positive obligations in cases
under s. 2 must prove that the fundamental freedom was rendered “impossible to exercise” and went
on, in the same paragraph, to add that claimants must demonstrate that “exclusion from a statutory
regime permits a substantial interference with the exercise of protected s. 2(d) activity” (emphasis in
original): Dunmore, supra, note 65, at para. 25. In other words, substantial interference is proved
when it has become “next to impossible” to exercise the right.
69
Here, as well, the Court acknowledged the subjectivity of this exercise, noting that
“[d]ifferent situations may demand different processes and timelines”: B.C. Health Services, supra,
note 53, at para. 107.
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bargaining process, and can include “union breaking” as well as “[a]cts
of bad faith, or unilateral nullification of negotiated terms, without any
process of meaningful discussion and consultation … ”.70
In this way, the joint opinion proposed a standard which rests on
subjective assessments of substantive matters, and which may for that
reason be difficult to apply in an even-handed manner. Beyond the
context of collective bargaining, it is worth reflecting on the role of
affirmative entitlements and positive obligations in Charter analysis. It
will seem to many that this double-barrelled entitlement marks a
progressive step in the evolution of rights-protective Charter doctrines.
Despite that impression, it remains the case that affirmative entitlements
and positive obligations are the exception rather than the rule under the
Charter.
Over the years, there has been much debate about the imposition of
positive duties on government under the Charter, especially (though not
exclusively) where there are fiscal implications or where a remedy
threatens judicial interference in matters of democratic governance.71 In
light of that debate, it is striking that the Court’s opinion in B.C. Health
Services created significant entitlements without discussing the
institutional burdens that are inherent in its model of due process rights.
In this, the decision is quite unlike Dunmore, which concerned a single
category of workers whose situation was rooted in circumstances that
could not be easily generalized or analogized to other settings. Dunmore
imposed institutional burdens which were significant, but discrete.72 By
contrast, B.C. Health Services set up a framework which is designed to
apply to collective bargaining across the public sector. Though the costs
of this due process model cannot be quantified, it is clear that the Court’s
collective bargaining scheme will impose substantial burdens on public
sector employers.73
70

Id., at para. 92.
In recent years the Court has consistently rejected arguments in favour of the existence
of positive obligations: see e.g., Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85,
[2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.); Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., [2004] S.C.J. No. 61,
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 381 (S.C.C.); and Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney
General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.).
72
In choosing a remedy, the Court stated that “at minimum the statutory freedom to
organize … ought to be extended to agricultural workers, along with the protections judged essential
to its meaningful exercise”, and that the remedy granted neither required nor forbade the inclusion
of agricultural workers in a full collective bargaining regime: Dunmore, supra, note 65, at paras. 67
and 68.
73
See Charney, supra, note 45.
71
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B.C. Health Services recognized certain exceptions to the scope of
collective bargaining rights under section 2(d), but found that they did
not apply to the case at hand. For instance, the government had argued,
in attempting to justify the legislation, that the statute was “a crucial
element of its response to a pressing health care crisis, [which was]
necessary and important to the well-being of British Columbians”.74
Earlier, the Court had allowed a province to roll back pay equity
entitlements, in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., where the
costs of enforcing Charter rights were quantified and were found, in
consequence, to impose an undue burden on the government.75 Yet in
B.C. Health Services, the province’s claim that the health care system
was in fiscal crisis found no purchase.76 In rejecting that claim, the Court
inferred that British Columbia’s legislation to amend the terms of
employment for health care workers was motivated by suspect, costcutting objectives.77
There is another problem with a conception of section 2(d) as a
source of positive rights. As Baier v. Alberta shows, this approach to
entitlement permits a regressive interpretation of fundamental Charter
freedoms.78 In that case, in a decision released a couple of weeks after
B.C. Health Services, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality, under section 2(b), of legislation which effectively
banned school board employees from running for office as school
district trustees.79 Though Rothstein J.’s majority opinion characterized
the prohibition as a “blanket restriction”, it did not treat the statutory
provision as an interference with expressive freedom which singled out
one class of candidates for disqualification from office.80 Rather than
follow the consistent pattern of the section 2(b) jurisprudence, which sets
a low standard for breach and resolves the question of limits under
74

B.C. Health Services, supra, note 53, at para. 3.
Supra, note 71.
76
The joint opinion stated that “[i]t is true that the government was facing a situation of
exigency”, “was determined to come to grips with the spiralling costs of health care”, and was
fuelled in this determination “by the laudable desire to provide quality health services to the people
of British Columbia”. The Court held, however, that the measures adopted constituted a “virtual
denial” of s. 2(d) rights. B.C. Health Services, supra, note 53, at paras. 134 and 135.
77
Id., at para. 147.
78
[2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.).
79
In the wake of a labour dispute, the province enacted the School Trustee Statutes
Amendment Act, 2002, S.A. 2002, c. 23, s. 1(2)(a), which banned school employees from running
for school board office.
80
Baier v. Alberta, supra, note 78, at para. 7.
75
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section 1, Rothstein J. redefined the issue. He found that school board
employees who were barred from office by the legislation were pressing
an affirmative entitlement, in the form of access to a “statutory
platform”.81 After classifying the claim as a positive right and noting that
section 2(b) is reserved for negative entitlements, Rothstein J. applied
the Dunmore criteria.82 There was no interference with expressive
freedom, he said, because employees who were disqualified from school
board positions remained free to engage in expressive activities.83
It is worth noting that the jurisprudence had once given the same
answer to workers who complained that excluding their unions from
statutory collective bargaining schemes violated section 2(d). Prior to
B.C. Health Services, in cases like PIPSC and Delisle, the Court
responded that the workers’ right to associate was unaffected because it
existed independently of the statute, and that nothing in the legislation
prevented individuals from forming or establishing associations on their
own initiative. While B.C. Health Services overruled that line of
thinking, it quickly reappeared in a slightly different context in Baier.
Although further discussion must be deferred to another day, Baier
confirms — for purposes of this article — that Dunmore’s “next to
impossible” threshold has gained a foothold in at least some other
settings.84 More specifically, Baier shows how section 2(d)’s restrictive
criteria have negatively influenced the interpretation of section 2(b).
That may be why Fish J.’s dissent in Baier claimed that it would be
“most ironic for the Court’s generous interpretation of freedom of
association under s. 2(d) in Dunmore to now be invoked here for the
purpose of narrowing the Court’s traditionally broad interpretation of the
historically and conceptually distinct freedom of expression guaranteed
by s. 2(b)”.85 Thus, Baier serves as a warning to beware of positive
rights: a narrowly drawn positive right, like that found in Dunmore, can
look promising, only to be applied to restrict the scope of entitlement
and uphold limits on the Charter’s fundamental freedoms, without the
81
Id., at para. 36. The concept of a “statutory platform” references a distinction between
claims that are legitimately rooted in the Charter’s fundamental freedoms, and those which
otherwise seek access to a statutory platform.
82
Id., at para. 20 (stating that “s. 2 generally imposes a negative obligation on government
rather than a positive obligation of protection or assistance”).
83
Id., at para. 48 (stating that, “absent inclusion in this statutory scheme”, employees have
not shown that they are “unable to express themselves on education issues”).
84
Id., at para. 30 and ff. (identifying and applying the criteria to the facts).
85
Id., at para. 100 (emphasis in original).
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necessity of a section 1 analysis. The concern is that what happened to
section 2(b) in Baier can also happen to section 2(d).86
In infusing the guarantee with procedural content and following
Dunmore’s lead on positive rights, B.C. Health Services gave section
2(d) a novel interpretation. Yet instead of grounding the framework of
collective bargaining in a conception of what associational freedom
means, the Court launched into a context-dependent discussion of labour
relations and collective bargaining. By focusing so closely on context,
the Court lost contact with the guarantee’s contours and produced
criteria which are overly customized to a single setting.
4. In Praise of Context
Context is valued and abstraction is not. The Court followed that
pattern of thought in B.C. Health Services by dismissing its earlier
section 2(d) decisions as unprincipled. According to the joint opinion,
the Labour Trilogy jurisprudence erred in conceptualizing associational
freedom as an abstract entitlement. In particular, the joint opinion
declared that the decontextualized approach of earlier decisions
compared poorly with the “purposive approach taken to other Charter
guarantees”.87 In other words, an abstract definition of the right is not
purposive. Such a “generic” approach, as the joint opinion termed it, had
regrettably caused the Court in early cases to overlook the context of
collective bargaining and its importance to the exercise of associational
freedom in labour relations.88 In this, B.C. Health Services provided a
critique of precedent which set up Dunmore as a revelation in
methodology. Chief Justice McLachlin and LeBel J. announced that
Dunmore had “correctly advocated a more contextual analysis” and
conducted “a more contextual assessment than found in the early s. 2(d)
cases”.89 The judges also praised Bastarache J.’s dissenting opinion in

86
Note that in Delisle, which was not overruled, the Court stated that s. 2 of the Charter
“generally requires only that the state not interfere”, that “except perhaps in exceptional
circumstances, freedom of expression requires only that Parliament not interfere”, and that “the
same is true for freedom of association”: supra, note 58, at paras. 25 and 27.
87
B.C. Health Services, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, 283 D.L.R. (4th) 40, at para. 30 (S.C.C.).
88
Id.
89
Id., at para. 33 (emphasis added).
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Advance Cutting & Coring for anticipating the contextual approach and
its emergence under section 2(d).90
A focus on context in B.C. Health Services served the Court’s
purpose of finding a way to constitutionalize collective bargaining.
Without commenting on what the Court said about collective bargaining
in Canada, this article questions a methodology which undertakes a
quixotic search for the pedigree of entitlements, and looks to the broader
implications of an approach that is heavily weighted toward a judicial
appreciation of “context”. In that regard, the section 2(b) jurisprudence
demonstrates that a contextual approach has merits, as well as serious
drawbacks.
In doctrinal terms, this approach dates from Wilson J.’s sole
concurring judgment in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney
General).91 There, she complained that the Court’s interpretation of
section 2(b) privileged an abstract conception of expressive freedom.
She called for a contextualization of the entitlement which would engage
the balancing of interests that must occur before justifiable limits can be
found. After Edmonton Journal, the concept quickly evolved into a
methodology for upholding limits under section 1 on “low value”
expressive activities.92 This version of the contextual approach reached
its apex in the late 1990s, with the Court’s decision in R. v. Lucas.93
Though the doctrinal cast of this approach has been modified,
context has retained its vitality in the section 2(b) jurisprudence.94 It has
been deployed in recent cases to save limits on political expression, even
90
Id. Throughout, the joint opinion treaded carefully around the Bastarache J.
jurisprudence under s. 2(d). The Chief Justice and LeBel J. heaped praise on Bastarache J.’s
majority opinion in Dunmore and, in doing so, managed to spare him the embarrassment of
overruling his majority opinion in Delisle.
91
[1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 (S.C.C.).
92
See R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.); R. v. Butler,
[1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (S.C.C.); Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995]
S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (S.C.C.); Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996]
S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 (S.C.C.); R.J.R.-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General),
[1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.) (dissenting opinion by La Forest J.); and R. v.
Lucas, [1998] S.C.J. No. 28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439 (S.C.C.). See generally J. Cameron, “The Past,
Present, and Future of Expressive Freedom under the Charter” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1
[hereinafter “Cameron”] (providing an analysis and critique of the contextual approach and its use
as a doctrinal tool to uphold limits on expression that is deemed to be of low value).
93
Id. There, the Court applied a “low-value analysis” to discount the expression at stake
and to uphold the Criminal Code’s (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46) defamatory libel provisions.
94
See Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44,
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Thomson Newspapers”]; Harper, [2004] S.C.J. No. 28,
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Bryan”].
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when the evidence failed to demonstrate that expressive activities were
harmful.95 From a certain perspective, using context to uphold limits on
high-value expression is more regressive than using it to withhold
protection from objectionable or low-value expression. In any case, the
jurisprudence reveals that a contextual approach has been consistently
applied to restrict the scope of section 2(b), not to expand it.96
In light of that experience, two concerns arise from the Court’s
reliance on context in B.C. Health Services. The first is that under this
approach, the question of breach under section 2(d) is entirely contingent
on shifting perceptions of context. For instance, whether collective
bargaining is protected by the Charter turned on the Court’s reading of
history, which could have supported any number of interpretations. In
principle, the use of history to validate the constitutional status of an
entitlement sets a dangerous precedent. Not only is the interpretation of
history a notoriously subjective project, it is one that ordinarily will not
generate progressive insights into the scope of entitlement.97 A key
difficulty in consulting history to determine the constitutional status of a
particular activity is that materials can be selectively sourced and cited to
advance or set back a claim; consequently, it is unreliable as a
methodology. That history emerged in B.C. Health Services as the
mainstay of the analysis does not augur well for other entitlements,
which will be contingent on the Court’s rendering of histories as well as
on contested perceptions of events.
Second, an approach that is exclusively contextual compromises the
fundamentals of constitutional interpretation. Essentially, B.C. Health
Services dismissed the earlier section 2(d) jurisprudence because it
rested on a theory of entitlement which was abstract and flawed for that
reason. This interpretation reveals a misapprehension of the cases, which
demonstrate that the Court’s interpretation of associational freedom
should draw its strength from section 2(d)’s underlying values. The
interpretation which emerged in the Labour Trilogy line of cases can be
challenged, and was challenged in B.C. Health Services, for its
95
See Harper (acknowledging that harm had not been established, but nonetheless
upholding third-party spending limits), and Bryan (upholding limits on the publication of election
results, again in the absence of evidence of harm): id.
96
But see Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 94.
97
As Lamer J. explained in the Motor Vehicle Reference, [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2
S.C.R. 486, at 509 (S.C.C.), “[i]f the newly planted ‘living tree’ which is the Charter is to have the
possibility of growth and adjustment over time, care must be taken to ensure that historical materials
… do not stunt its growth”.
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misguided reliance on an individualistic approach to inherently
collective activity. While the concept of entitlement in those cases was
flawed, the Court’s methodology was not. Unless section 2(d) is to be
restricted in scope to what is purely contextual, the guarantee must have
an abstract definition which is rooted in associational freedom’s
underlying values. Ironically, B.C. Health Services is the converse of
what Wilson J. complained of in Edmonton Journal: in place of a
definition that privileged abstract values at the expense of their
contextual setting, B.C. Health Services chose an alternative that
privileged context at the expense of an abstract or conceptual foundation
for the guarantee.
When B.C. Health Services overruled precedent, section 2(d)’s
conceptual foundation all but collapsed. Yet in taking this dramatic step,
the Court did little to create a new foundation for the guarantee.98
Instead, the decision was so dependent on the context of collective
bargaining that the guarantee’s abstract content and underlying values
were effectively excluded from the analysis. The Court endorsed the
proposition that section 2(d) protects collective activities, but limited its
observations and reflections on associational freedom to the labour law
context.
5. Regressive Consequences
This part of the article considers what the constitutionalization of
collective bargaining implies for section 2(d). As shown above, the
Court combined existing doctrines and concepts to create a new model
of rights under this guarantee. While this methodology promoted one
category of collective activity — labour negotiations — it did not
advance a purposive interpretation of associational freedom. For
example, characterizing collective bargaining as a process allowed the
Court to dodge the distinction between an association and its activities.
In the face of a consistent line of authority that made it awkward to
protect associational activity, re-describing labour negotiations as a
process or procedure appeared to present a solution. Thus, the Court in
B.C. Health Services customized its interpretation of section 2(d) to meet
the requirements of collective bargaining. The risk is that a solution that
98
Compare Dunmore, [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, at paras. 16 and 17
(S.C.C.), which discussed the status of collective activity under s. 2(d), but did so without explicitly
disapproving of or overruling authorities that advanced an individualistic conception of the right.
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is expressly context-dependent in design might be unthinkingly applied
to section 2(d) claims in other, dissimilar settings.
To suggest, for instance, that the decision redefined all associational
activity as a process, which can be distinguished from its substantive
objects and outcomes, would obliterate the doctrinal distinction between
an association and its activity. Reading B.C. Health Services in this way
would radically enlarge the scope of section 2(d). However, in the
absence of indication that the Court views associational activity as
inherently procedural, it is more likely that section 2(d)’s due process
rights for collective bargaining will narrow the scope of the guarantee.
Not only could the content of associational freedom be transformed from
substantive to procedural, the new due process rights would be available
only where the additional criteria set out in B.C. Health Services are met.
As indicated, the context and substantial interference elements of the
analysis set a high threshold for breach, which might not be easily
satisfied in other settings.
Paradoxically, the Court’s enforcement of positive rights and duties
might also have adverse consequences for associational freedom. As
noted above, positive rights and obligations are usually seen as
exceptional in nature — especially, in the Court’s view, under section 2
— and are available only in prescribed circumstances. Despite
recognizing an entitlement, Dunmore and B.C. Health Services
established criteria which may be applied restrictively, thereby limiting
the scope of section 2(d) and other fundamental Charter freedoms to the
rare or exceptional case when positive rights can be found and duties
imposed. Already, Baier v. Alberta has demonstrated how Dunmore can
be twisted to re-frame a negative entitlement in positive terms and
eliminate a claim from the Charter. As shown above, the Court in Baier
applied Dunmore’s narrow criteria for positive rights to countermand an
established line of authority and rationalize a regressive interpretation of
section 2(b). A concept of positive rights which worked for agricultural
workers in Dunmore and collective bargaining in B.C. Health Services
has a dark side, and a documented potential to deny rights which would
have been recognized under a traditional conception of negative
entitlement.
Finally, a contextual approach allowed the Court in B.C. Health
Services to establish the pedigree of collective bargaining. A warning is
likewise in order on that feature of the decision’s methodology. That
“context” is inherently malleable has largely been its strength but, thus
far, this approach has been more rights-constraining than rights-
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enhancing. At least under section 2(b) — and under section 15 as well
— context has been invoked to deny, rather than to validate,
entitlement.99 In B.C. Health Services, the Court’s survey of collective
bargaining history led to an expansion of rights under section 2(d); as
has been observed, however, history is more frequently invoked to
narrow than to enlarge the scope of entitlement. For all the praise it
attracted in B.C. Health Services, the contextual approach has done as
much, or more, to limit Charter rights and freedoms than it has to protect
them.
Singling out one aspect of associational activity for constitutionalization, purely on the basis of its context, does not advance section 2(d)’s
purposes, nor does it ground decision-making in principles of
constitutional interpretation. B.C. Health Services relied on a concept of
entitlement that was so heavily and exclusively contextualized to
collective bargaining that the decision lost contact with the underlying
values which have anchored section 2(d) since the Labour Trilogy. As a
matter of constitutional interpretation, the risk is that by overcontextualizing the guarantee to labour relations issues, the Court may
deny section 2(d) a generous and purposive interpretation which would
allow it to take its place among the Charter’s other rights and freedoms.
To summarize, the Court’s due process model of collective
bargaining may have regressive consequences for section 2(d) and other
fundamental freedoms. It should be emphasized that B.C. Health
Services spoke explicitly to the circumstances of collective bargaining,
and did not address the “generic” meaning of the guarantee or suggest
how it ought to be interpreted. Significantly, there is no indication that
the Court intended its decision in B.C. Health Services to have negative
consequences for associational freedom, and none should therefore be
assumed. In developing its due process model for collective bargaining,
the Court said nothing that would compromise section 2(d)’s prospects
in other settings. To the contrary, B.C. Health Services took a vital step
in renewing the promise this guarantee held out so many years ago,
before the Labour Trilogy was decided. From that perspective, the better
view is that B.C. Health Services should be read as a decision which is
limited to collective bargaining, and which has otherwise left the
challenge of redefining associational freedom to another day.
99
In the case of s. 2(b), see supra, notes 92-94; in the case of s. 15, see Law v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.)
(adopting a four-part contextual approach to interpretation of the guarantee, which has made it
extremely difficult for claimants to establish a breach of equality rights).
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The following comments reflect briefly on that larger project. Within
the limits of this article, the discussion can do no more than frame some
of the issues which call for fresh consideration.

III. A THEORY OF ENTITLEMENT
In B.C. Health Services, the Court opened up section 2(d) for the
first time, essentially, since the Labour Trilogy, but did so without
committing itself to a theory of entitlement. For that reason the Court
should not be quick to extend concepts which were designed to address
labour questions — and which may work in that setting — to other
issues of associational freedom. Nor should it be assumed that section
2(d) is “reserved” for labour claims. Rather, B.C. Health Services should
be read as a signal that the Court may now be ready to allow freedom of
association to come into its own as one of the Charter’s fundamental
freedoms. It is encouraging that B.C. Health Services has provided a
fresh opportunity to rethink the “value added” of a textual guarantee that
is dedicated to the protection of associational freedom. In doing so, it is
useful to reflect on the first 20 years of section 2(d) jurisprudence, and to
consider the lessons of that history.
From the outset, co-existing conceptions of associational freedom
could be found in the jurisprudence. Under one view, section 2(d) had
special, or nearly exclusive, significance for the rights of workers. There
were skeptics, too, but many saw the Charter as a potentially
transformative force for labour relations. In part because much of the
jurisprudence addressed claims that pressed for the protection of union
activities under the Charter, labour issues have been dominant in the
literature on section 2(d).100 Generally, this literature is critical of the
100
Virtually all of the secondary literature on s. 2(d) debates its implications for labour
relations. A short and selective list of articles discussing the Charter and labour relations includes
P. Cavalluzzo, “Freedom of Association and the Right to Bargain Collectively” in J.M. Weiler &
R.M. Elliot, eds. Litigating the Values of a Nation (Toronto: Carswell, 1986); P. Gall, “Freedom of
Association and Trade Unions: A Double-Edged Sword” in Weiler & Elliot, id.; B. Etherington,
“Freedom of Association and Compulsory Union Dues: Towards a Purposive Conception of a
Freedom Not to Associate” (1987) 19 Ottawa L. Rev. 1; H. Arthurs, “‘The Right to Golf’:
Reflections on the Future of Workers, Unions and the Rest of Us under the Charter” (1988) 13
Queen’s L.J. 17; J. Fudge, “Labour, the New Constitution and Old Style Liberalism” (1988) 13
Queen’s L.J. 61; D. Beatty, “Labouring outside the Charter” (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L.J 839;
P. Weiler, “The Charter at Work: Reflections on the Constitutionalizing of Labour and Employment
Law” (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 117; B. Etherington, “Lavigne v. O.P.S.E.U.: Moving Toward or Away
From a Freedom Not to Associate” (1991) 23 Ottawa L. Rev. 533; J. Cameron, “The ‘Second
Labour Trilogy’: A Comment on R. v. Advance Cutting, Dunmore v. Ontario, and R.W.D.S.U. v.
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Labour Trilogy’s refusal to constitutionalize collective bargaining and
the right to strike; despite offering an inconclusive set of opinions, these
decisions led to negative outcomes for organized labour in PIPSC and
Delisle, and otherwise stifled the development of a vibrant jurisprudence.101
Yet the results were not as one-sided as some suppose: labour unions
won significant victories in key decisions which tested the principle of
non-association. In Lavigne and again in Advance Cutting & Coring, the
Court departed from an individualist conception of the right, to protect
union interests from those who sought to be free from compelled
association with unions and their causes.102 Though the Labour Trilogy
and its progeny relied on an individualistic definition of the right to
exclude collective bargaining and the right to strike from the Charter,
these two decisions applied a collective conception of association —
either in interpreting section 2(d) or in applying Oakes — to defeat
challenges to mandatory dues check-off for non-workplace activities,
and to compulsory union membership as a condition of employment.103
More recently, the McLachlin Court has steadily advanced the interests

Pepsi-Cola” (2002) 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 68; J. Fudge, “‘Labour Is Not a Commodity’: The Supreme
Court of Canada and the Freedom of Association” (2004) 67 Sask. L. Rev. 425 [hereinafter “Labour
Is Not a Commodity”]; and D. Pothier, “Twenty Years of Labour Law and the Charter” (2002) 40
Osgoode Hall L.J. 369, at 387.
For articles on s. 2(d) which do not focus on labour relations, see J. Cameron, “Back to
Fundamentals: Multidisciplinary Partnerships and Freedom of Association under s. 2(d)” (2000) 50
U.T.L.J. 261; C. Sheppard, “Intimacy, Rights and the Parent-Child Relationship: Rethinking
Freedom of Association in Canada” (2004) 16 N.J.C.L. 103; and K. Norman, “Freedom of
Association” in G.-A. Beaudoin & E. Mendes, eds., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 4th
ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2005), c. 7.
101
See supra, notes 2 and 4.
102
Lavigne, [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.); Advance Cutting & Coring,
[2001] S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209 (S.C.C.).
103
In Lavigne, for example, La Forest J. upheld the use by unions of mandatory dues for
non-collective bargaining purposes under s. 1, because allowing employees to opt out could
seriously undermine unionism’s financial base and membership, as well as “undermine the spirit of
solidarity which is so important to the emotional and symbolic underpinnings of unionism”. Id., at
336-37. Subsequently, the Court’s decision in Advance Cutting & Coring upheld compulsory union
membership as a condition of employment in Quebec’s construction industry. Four members of the
Court found that such a condition did not violate s. 2(d). For instance, LeBel J. held that inner limits
and restrictions should be read into any concept of non-association to ensure that individuals are not
denied the benefits of collective activities. To avoid treating the guarantee as “an inferior right,
barely tolerated and narrowly circumscribed”, LeBel J. endorsed mandatory membership as a way
of advancing the union’s self-actualization through its “group voice” and “common strength”. Id., at
para. 208.
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of unions under the Charter in cases which include Dunmore, PepsiCola104 and now B.C. Health Services.
From the beginning, members of the Court offered a second
perspective on section 2(d), which undertook to identify section 2(d)’s
underlying values and to define the scope of the right in abstract terms.
In doing so, these judges applied the same approach to associational
freedom that was followed in interpreting other guarantees, such as those
in sections 2(a) and (b), 7 and 15.105 Accordingly, while Le Dain J.’s
Alberta Reference reasons provided a definition of sorts and dismissed
the claim in four curt paragraphs, McIntyre J. and Dickson C.J.C. wrote
at length about the nature of associational freedom. An abstract or
conceptual approach led McIntyre J. to conclude that rights of
association under section 2(d) must be defined in the same way as
individual rights. His reliance on the same-treatment principle avoided a
double standard which would have allowed groups and organizations to
claim special rights and privileges under the Charter.
By comparison, Dickson C.J.C.’s dissent in the Alberta Reference
showed how an abstract definition of associational freedom could
promote a generous and purposive interpretation of the right. He
disputed McIntyre J.’s analysis, and proposed a definition that reflected
the distinctive features and needs of associational activity. Chief Justice
Dickson remonstrated that conceiving of section 2(d) as an individual
right stripped it of content and meaning. He also resisted an
interpretation that read the guarantee down, by treating inherently
collective activity as a mere derivative of individual action — an
interpretation which, in his view, made “surplusage” of section 2(d).106
Chief Justice Dickson contended, quite forcefully, that a failure to
extend “effective protection to the interests to which the constitutional
guarantee is directed” would render the freedom “legalistic, ungenerous,

104
R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No.
7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (S.C.C.) (modifying the common law rule in relation to s. 2(b) of the Charter,
which treated secondary picketing as per se illegal).
105
See, e.g., R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.)
(defining freedom of religion); Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”] (defining s. 2(b)); Motor Vehicle Reference,
supra, note 97 (interpreting s. 7); and Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J.
No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) (interpreting s. 15).
106
Alberta Reference, [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, at 364 (S.C.C.). He added
that “the express conferral of a freedom of association is unnecessary if all that is intended is to give
effect to the collective enjoyment of other individual freedoms”.
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indeed vapid”.107 Similarly, he dismissed the distinction between the
form of an association and the objects or substance of its activities, and
emphasized that associational behaviour may have no analogy in the
actions of an individual acting alone.108 Unsuccessfully, he urged other
members of the Court to recognize that freedom of association is a
distinctive entitlement which requires a distinctive interpretation.
B.C. Health Services rejected the abstract and generic approach
which had crystallized in PIPSC’s four-point framework.109 Yet it was
the content of the PIPSC definition of associational freedom, not an
abstract concept of the right, that was problematic. Chief Justice
Dickson’s reasons in the Alberta Reference illustrate the value of an
abstract approach, and confirm that an interpretation that defines a
guarantee’s underlying purposes need not preclude attention to context.
Accordingly, after defining the entitlement, Dickson C.J.C. analyzed the
circumstances of the case, and concluded that collective bargaining and
the right to strike were protected by section 2(d). His analysis shows that
B.C. Health Services was mistaken in assuming or implying that the
Court must choose between the abstract and the contextual. An abstract
approach which cannot take account of diverse contexts will present
problems, but an approach that is purely contextual is not free from
difficulty either.
At the time of the Labour Trilogy, the Court feared section 2(d)’s
consequences for labour relations, but also felt that “generic” collective
activity could not be constitutionalized. Although a labour context was
dominant in the key landmarks, it is difficult to tell whether those
decisions gave associational freedom an individualist interpretation to
prevent the constitutionalization of union activities, or whether the
exclusion of labour activities was a by-product of the Court’s
determination not to constitutionalize all associational activity. Both
dynamics were present and, either way, the guarantee was trapped in an
individualist definition.
The “no go” zone for associational freedom, as it was called in B.C.
Health Services, not only ensured the failure of most labour claims, but
compromised section 2(d)’s opportunities on other questions as well. If
McIntyre J.’s musings about the constitutional right to golf in a
107

Id., at 363.
Thus he noted, in the context of a right to strike, that “[t]he refusal to work by one
individual does not parallel a collective refusal to work” because “[t]he latter is qualitatively rather
than quantitatively different.” Id., at 367 (emphasis in original).
109
See supra, note 57.
108
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foursome did not prove the point that virtually all human activity is
social or associational,110 Wilson J.’s dissent in R. v. Skinner, which
would have protected solicitation by prostitutes under section 2(d),
showed the potential consequences of an uninhibited conception of
entitlement.111 As a result, the only non-labour claim that has succeeded
under section 2(d) was in Libman v. Quebec, where freedom of
association rode section 2(b)’s coat-tails.112 Attempts to establish a claim
in other settings, some of which were meritorious, consistently
foundered.113
Though more in theory than in practice, labour and non-labour
entitlements co-existed in the first 20 years of section 2(d) jurisprudence.
Labour claims may have dominated, but still the Court entertained non110
Alberta Reference, supra, note 106, at 408 (rejecting a definition of s. 2(d) which would
deny the legislature the authority to allow golf to be played in pairs but not in greater numbers).
111
[1990] S.C.J. No. 51, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1235 (S.C.C.). In Wilson J.’s view it was
inappropriate to exclude the solicitation of an act of prostitution from the scope of the guarantee
simply because of “the purpose for which the parties seek to associate”; on that point, the Alberta
Reference was clear that “[o]nly the coming together is protected.” Id., at 1249. Citing Irwin Toy,
Wilson J. insisted that the logic that applies to s. 2(b) “also holds good for s. 2(d) of the Charter”.
Id., at 1251. Meanwhile, Dickson C.J.C. rejected Wilson J.’s view, which seemed to suggest that
every restriction on expression would violate s. 2(d), because expressive activity is communicative
and for that reason inherently associational. The Chief Justice saw that such an unbridled conception
of entitlement could constitutionalize any and all activity that is social in nature.
112
[1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.). In Libman a unanimous panel held
that the province’s rules for third-party spending in referendum campaigns violated s. 2(b) and 2(d)
of the Charter. Briefly, the legislation established national “yes” and “no” committees, and granted
those committees the authority to incur “regulated expenditures”. Campaign spending outside the
umbrella committees was permitted, but only to a maximum of $600. Otherwise, the legislation
allowed those who preferred not to associate with either of the committees to “affiliate” instead.
This option gave groups and individuals the opportunity to participate while maintaining some
semblance of independence.
Though the Court invalidated the scheme under s. 2(b), it found that Quebec’s referendum
rules also violated s. 2(d), because provisions that infringed the expressive freedom of individuals
also offended the rights of groups and organizations. As such, the spending limit fell squarely within
the principle that the Charter protects associational freedom when a group or organization is
prevented from exercising another fundamental freedom. While it invalidated the spending limit
under both guarantees, the Court’s analysis drew entirely from the jurisprudence on freedom of
expression.
113
See, e.g., Black, [1989] S.C.J. No. 27, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591 (S.C.C.) (invoking the
vocabulary of s. 2(d) — but not deciding the case on this ground — to support a conclusion that
Law Society Rules prohibiting interprovincial law firms violated the mobility rights of lawyers);
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency, [1998] S.C.J. No. 78, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.) (rejecting a
claim that an egg marketing scheme which excluded territorial participants violated s. 2(d) of the
Charter, against a dissent based on s. 6 mobility rights); Suresh, [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R.
3 (S.C.C.) (declining to consider whether the Immigration Act’s criteria for deportation, which are
based on an assumption of guilt by association, violate s. 2(d)); and Harper, [2004] S.C.J. No. 28,
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.) (finding no violation of s. 2(d) in federal campaign spending
legislation).
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labour claims. More recently, the Court’s decisions have favoured union
interests. In that regard, the non-association cases were the first to signal
a turn in the section 2(d) jurisprudence. Labour considerations emerged
more emphatically than they had previously in Lavigne v. O.P.S.E.U.
and Advance Cutting & Coring, where the Court made explicit its
solicitude for union security. And, as noted, a trend in favour of labour
has become more pronounced in the McLachlin Court’s decisions. While
Dunmore boosted labour’s prospects under the Charter,114 the decision
has not had a favourable impact on positive rights under other
guarantees.115 Meanwhile, though Pepsi-Cola was not a section 2(d)
case, it was a breakthrough for labour which, like Dunmore, required the
Court to give some of its own precedents an inventive interpretation.116
Most notable, thus far, is B.C. Health Services, which dedicated its
discussion of section 2(d) entirely to the constitutionalization of
collective bargaining.
Today, section 2(d) is at a juncture which makes it imperative to ask
whether non-labour claims have any remaining traction. In raising that
question for the future, three observations can be made. First of all,
section 2(d) guarantees a fundamental Charter freedom, and does so in
inclusive terms which draw no distinction between labour and nonlabour claims. A short digression, comparative in perspective, may be
appropriate. Despite not being protected in the text of the constitution,
freedom of association is regarded in the United States as one of the
cornerstones of that country’s constitutional tradition. Accordingly, it is
worth noting that the distinctions relied on in Charter jurisprudence to
narrow the guarantee are not found in American doctrine. For instance, it
does not particularly matter to the U.S. Supreme Court whether freedom
of association is individual or collective in nature; neither does that
Court draw a distinction between an association and its activities.
Moreover, although labour issues play a role in the American
jurisprudence, it is not a major or dominant role. To the contrary,
protecting organizations from being targeted by the state, recognizing
forms of intimate association and providing a check on compelled
114
“Labour Is Not a Commodity”, supra, note 100, at 437 (stating that “Dunmore marks a
major change in direction”); see also (2003) C.L.E.L.J. 1 and ff., “Special Section on Labour Law
and the Charter” (2003) 10 C.L.E.L.J. 1.
115
In addition to Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, 283 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.), see
Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.)
(Bastarache J., dissenting).
116
See Cameron, supra, note 92 (commenting on the Court’s Charter values analysis).
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association have been the U.S. Supreme Court’s primary concerns.117
The point is that, while labour entitlements are one of the cornerstones of
the guarantee in section 2(d), they neither define nor exhaust the scope
of associational freedom.
Second, it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has
set up a contest between abstract and contextual approaches to the
interpretation of rights. For instance, the Court made it clear in B.C.
Health Services that it was choosing between the two, and that
“contextualizing” is superior to abstract thinking. Although this contest
dates back to Edmonton Journal, the assumption that the Court must
make a choice between the abstract and the contextual has never been
convincing. It is not clear why a contextual approach must be promoted
at the expense of abstract principles. Nor does it make sense to view
abstract principles as innately flawed and a contextual approach as
irrefutably valid. In addition, it is difficult to see how an entitlement can
be defined solely in contextual terms, without reference to the
underlying values and rationales which give it meaning outside and
beyond the competing interests at stake in particular circumstances. For
these reasons, any reconsideration of section 2(d) must examine the
relationship between the abstract and the contextual, and define the roles
each should play in constitutional interpretation.
A third point is that B.C. Health Services failed to address or resolve
the status of individual and collective entitlements under section 2(d).
The early jurisprudence made the critical mistake of adopting an
individualist conception of the entitlement and thereby excluding
collective activity from the Charter. Now that Dunmore and B.C. Health
Services have declared that section 2(d) protects at least some collective
action, the Court may once again be tempted to engage in either-or
thinking. The question is whether the recognition that section 2(d)
includes collective activity necessarily means that there is no freedom of
association for individuals under this guarantee. Here, too, it is essential,
in rethinking how associational freedom should be defined, to ask

117

Some of the key cases — which do not raise labour issues — include N.A.A.C.P. v.
Button, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) and N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (concerning
associational freedom and the civil rights movement); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961)
and Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (concerning associational freedom during the Cold
War); Zablocki v. Redtail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) and
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (concerning associational freedom and intimate relations);
and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) and Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (protecting freedom from compelled association).
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whether and to what extent freedom of association is both an individual
and a collective entitlement.
Much energy will be devoted to discussion of B.C. Health Services
and its implications for labour relations. By constitutionalizing the
activity and creating due process rights, B.C. Health Services marks a
new era for collective bargaining in Canada. The decision also has the
potential to lead to an invigorated and purposive interpretation of the
Charter guarantee of associational freedom. For such an interpretation to
emerge, care must be taken not to assume that the Court’s approach in
B.C. Health Services — which was specific to the circumstances of
collective bargaining — established a new methodology for section 2(d).
In rethinking the meaning of associational freedom, it is important to
return to the guarantee’s roots, which are found primarily in Dickson
C.J.C.’s Alberta Reference dissent and in Bastarache J.’s discussion of
its abstract values and purposes in Dunmore v. Ontario. That conception
of entitlement, and not a case-by-case contextualization of the guarantee,
holds the key to section 2(d)’s aspirations.
Twenty years after the Labour Trilogy, the Supreme Court of
Canada decided to give section 2(d) of the Charter a second chance.
Whatever the future holds for collective bargaining, B.C. Health
Services is an exciting decision because it has, at last, created an
opportunity for freedom of association to flourish. Developing a theory
of entitlement for section 2(d) — one which can guide the evolution of
the guarantee — is now a priority.

